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RESEARCH REPORT
Tell Me What You Believe and
I’ll Tell You What You Want:
Empirical Evidence for Discriminating
Value Patterns of Five Types of
Religiosity
Johnny R. J. Fontaine, Patrick Luyten, and Jozef Corveleyn
Department of Psychology
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium
On the basis of Wulff’s (1997) theoretical model of religious attitudes and of
Schwartz’s (1992; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995) value theory, a refined theoretical
framework has been constructed and empirically tested concerning the relation be-
tween 5 types of religiosity and personal value orientation. Two theoretical value pat-
terns associated with religiosity were identified: A theological one focused on tran-
scendence and mutual care, and a sociopsychological one focused on acceptance of
social order and avoidance of uncertainty. Religious commitment and Hutsebaut’s
(1996) types of religious attitudes, which are based on Wulff’s theoretical model,
were, in a theoretically predicted and meaningful way, empirically related to a differ-
ent value pattern. Moreover, each observed pattern could be explained as a specific
combination of the 2 theoretically derived value patterns.
In the past, the relation between values and religion has played a central part in the-
ories of theologians, philosophers, sociologists, and psychologists (e.g., Marx,
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Weber, Freud, Tillich). The interest in this relation persists to date. A good example
of this continuing interest is the great attention paid by many people to the so-called
loss of values in our Western society, which is attributed by many scholars from dif-
ferent fields to a decline in religiosity. Although religion cannot be reduced to a set
of abstract moral norms or values, they do form an important part of each religion
(Vergote, 1997). Therefore, at a psychological level, it is theoretically interesting to
study the relations between personal religious commitment and religious attitudes,
which we refer to as religiosity on one hand and individuals’ personal value orienta-
tion on the other.
The first empirical approach to human values as transsituational (abstract)
guiding principles in one’s life and the investigation of their relation to religiosity
has to be credited to Rokeach (1968, 1969a, 1969b, 1973). He asked participants to
rank 18 instrumental and 18 terminal values as guiding principles in their lives and
compared religious and nonreligious participants with respect to the average rank
order of each value item. He found that religious participants estimated the value
terms salvation, forgiveness, and obedience higher and the value terms pleasure,
independence, intellect, and logic lower than nonreligious participants did. Most
of the subsequent empirical research on the relation between religiosity and value
orientation was inspired by Rokeach’s approach (e.g., Lau, 1989; Paloutzian,
1981; Sohlberg, 1986; Wolfe & Mourribi, 1985). However, this approach shows
two shortcomings. First, individual religiousness is often merely defined in terms
of belief and nonbelief or research has been limited to comparisons between differ-
ent religious denominations. Thus, religiosity is often treated as a unidimensional,
homogeneous characteristic within or between religious denominations. More-
over, even the rare studies using classical multidimensional approaches toward re-
ligiosity (e.g., Tate & Miller, 1971, using the intrinsic–extrinsic religiosity
measures of Allport & Ross, 1967) can be questioned because these approaches
have been recently criticized on both psychometric and conceptual grounds (see
Hood, Spilka, Hunsberger, & Gorsuch, 1996; Kirkpatrick & Hood, 1990). The
second shortcoming has to do with Rokeach’s (1973) value approach. Aside from
the methodological problems associated with rankings, each value item is treated
separately, and with 36 values this leads to poorly organized results. New develop-
ments during the last decade in the conceptualization and measurement of both re-
ligious attitudes (Hutsebaut, 1996, 1997) and human values (Schwartz, 1992) offer
the possibility to shed a new light on their relation.
Recent theoretical and empirical research by Schwartz and Huismans (1995)
about the relation between religiosity and value orientation builds on Schwartz’s
(1992) new conceptualization of values. They showed that there is a theoreti-
cally meaningful pattern of associations between religious commitment and a
representative set of values in four Western religions (Schwartz & Huismans,
1995). In all four religious groups, religiosity was associated with the impor-
tance of “respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that tra-
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ditional culture and religion provide” and a de-emphasis on “pleasure and
sensuous gratification for oneself” (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995, p. 90). How-
ever, Schwartz and Huismans only used a unidimensional conceptualization of
religiosity in terms of subjective religiosity and church attendance. In this article
we not only try to replicate their findings, but we also confront their theory and
findings with the new multidimensional conceptualization and measurement of
religious attitudes by Hutsebaut (1996, 1997). Furthermore, we investigate
whether and how the various dimensions of religious attitudes are related to dif-
ferent value priorities. Thus, the aims of this study are to (a) empirically repli-
cate Schwartz and Huismans’s findings, (b) refine and extend their theoretical
framework from a unidimensional to a multidimensional view on religiosity and
to the according differences in relations between various types of religiosity and
personal value orientation, and (c) empirically test the extended theoretical
framework.
SCHWARTZ’S VALUE APPROACH
Schwartz (1992) developed a comprehensive theory about the content and the
structure of the value domain, which has been empirically supported in more than
40 countries (Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995). He defined a value as a transsituational, de-
sirable goal that varies in importance as a guiding principle in one’s life. On the ba-
sis of theoretical analyses and extensive empirical research, 10 different value
types, each characterized by their own motivational goal, have been identified: uni-
versalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, security, power, achievement, he-
donism, stimulation, and self-direction (see Table 1). These 10 value types can be
organized into a two-dimensional circular circumplex structure on the basis of the
mutual compatibilities and conflicts between their respective motivational goals
(see Figure 1). Value types that share compatible motivational goals are most posi-
tively correlated and emerge adjacent to one another in the two-dimensional repre-
sentation. Value types that are characterized by conflicting motivational goals are
less, or even negatively, correlated and are situated opposite one another in the
two-dimensional representation.
Schwartz’s theory and research means a considerable improvement with re-
spect to Rokeach’s (1973) earlier work. Instead of using 36 distinct values,
Schwartz identified 10 theoretically distinct and stable value types, and he speci-
fied mutual compatibilities and conflicts between these 10 value types. More-
over, because these value types can be situated in a circular circumplex pattern,
associations between these value types and external variables are expected to
follow a specific, sinusoid pattern. Thus, if the value type that should be most
positively related with an external variable and the value type that should be
most negatively related with an external variable can be identified, then the or-
DISCRIMINATING VALUE PATTERNS 67
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der of all other relations with that external variable can be predicted on the basis
of the circumplex structure.1 The relations should systematically decrease as one
goes from the most positively related to the most negatively related value type,
or they should systematically increase as one goes from the most negatively re-
lated to the most positively related value type.
THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT
AND PERSONAL VALUE ORIENTATION
Using a unidimensional conceptualization of religiosity, Schwartz and Huismans
(1995) theoretically derived and empirically confirmed a single religious value pat-
68 FONTAINE, LUYTEN, CORVELEYN
TABLE 1
Definition of Motivational Types of Values in Terms of Their Goals and the Single Values
That Represent Them
Power Social status and prestige, control, or dominance over people and resources (social
power, authority, wealth, preserving my public image) [social recognition].a
Achievement Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards
(successful, capable, ambitious, influential) [intelligent].
Hedonism Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself (pleasure, enjoying life,
self-indulgence) [sexuality].
Stimulation Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life (daring, a varied life, an exciting life).
Self-direction Independent thought and action choosing, creating, exploring (creativity, freedom,
independent, curious, choosing own goals) [self-respect].
Universalism Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people
and for nature (broad-minded, wisdom, social justice, equality, a world at peace,
a world of beauty, unity with nature, protecting the environment).
Benevolence Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in
frequent personal contact (helpful, honest, forgiving, loyal, responsible) [true
friendship, mature love].
Tradition Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional
culture or religion provide (humble, accepting my portion in life, devout, respect
for tradition, moderate) [detachment].
Conformity Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and
violate social expectations or norms (obedient, politeness, self-discipline,
honoring parents and elders).
Security Safety; harmony and stability of society, relationships, and self (family security,
national security, social order, cleanliness, reciprocation of favors) [sense of
belonging, health].
Note. From “Values Priorities and Religiosity in Four Western Religions,” by S. H. Schwartz and S.
Huismans, 1995, Social Psychology Quarterly, June, p. 90. Copyright 1995 by the American Sociological
Association. Reprinted with permission.
aValues in square brackets were not used in computing indexes for value types.
1The size of the empirical associations between the value types is not so large as to completely deter-
mine the order of correlations with external variables. Only a tendency for a sinusoid correlational pat-
tern can be expected.
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tern in terms of the 10 value types on the basis of a theological, sociological, and
psychological analysis of the relation between religiosity and value orientation. As
they expected, tradition was found to be most positively correlated with religiosity
and hedonism most negatively, whereas the correlations for all other value types
were situated in between, according to their position in the circumplex structure.
The correlations decreased from tradition over benevolence, universalism, self-di-
rection, and stimulation to hedonism, and the correlations increased from hedonism
over achievement, power, security, and conformity to tradition. Because we use a
multidimensional approach toward religiosity, we treated each classical approach
in its own right. Later we investigate to which extent each approach has differential
validity for different types of religiosity. We first present these approaches, limit-
ing ourselves to Christianity.
According to a Christian theological analysis, religion is in essence characterized
by an orientation toward and a dependency on a personal God and a transcendence
of material concerns and temporary affective desires (e.g., Niebuhr, 1935; Schwartz
& Huismans, 1995; Tillich, 1956; Vergote, 1997). This implies awe and respect for a
God which is expressed through regular worship and personal control over material
and affective desires. Being centered on one’s self, the material world, and one’s
temporary affective desires is rejected from a theological perspective. However, the
focus toward a transcendent God represents only one fundamental dimension of
Christianity. The other fundamental dimension of Christianity, which has not been
discussed by Schwartz and Huismans because their analysis was not limited to
DISCRIMINATING VALUE PATTERNS 69
FIGURE 1 Theoreticalmodelof relationsamongvalue types.From“ValuesPriorities andReligios-
ity in Four Western Religions,” by S. H. Schwartz and S. Huismans, 1995, Social Psychology
Quarterly, June, p. 91. Copyright 1995 by the American Sociological Association. Reprinted
with permission
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Christian religion, deals with the love for human beings wether or not they belong to
one’s own social group as a divine command (Vergote, 1997). This implies an orien-
tation toward and a care for other humans and the rejection of self-centeredness.
Thus, from a pure theological perspective, Christian religiosity should imply a value
pattern that is characterized by Transcendence and Mutual Care, a pattern which we
named the TC value pattern.
We translated this theological TC value pattern in terms of Schwartz’s 10 value
types. The TC value pattern is expected if only the theological analysis accounted
for the relation between religiosity and value orientation. Under this condition it is
hypothesized that religiosity will correlate highest with tradition and benevolence
and lowest (or even negatively) with hedonism and achievement, with a gradual
decrease of the correlations from tradition over conformity, security, and power to
achievement and from benevolence over universalism, self-direction, and stimula-
tion to hedonism (see also Table 2 in the Results section). The value type tradition
that is characterized by commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas pro-
vided by religion most clearly expresses the importance of striving for transcen-
dence, whereas benevolence, defined as preservation and enhancement of the
welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact, most clearly ex-
presses the importance of mutual care. Also, conformity is compatible with an atti-
tude of awe and respect for a transcendent reality, whereas universalism, with its
focus on the well-being of all human beings, shares the mutual care perspective.
Stimulation, with its focus on pleasurable arousal, expresses self-indulgence,
whereas power, with its focus on social status, expresses materialism. Thus, both
stimulation and power should be in conflict with religiosity. For self-direction and
security, no clear predictions can be made. Although self-direction can be conflict-
ing with a focus on transcendence and mutual care, it can also be conflicting with
materialism. Also, from a theological perspective, the value type security can be
both compatible and conflicting with religiosity. To the extent that security implies
in-group solidarity, it is compatible with religiosity. However, because security
values are often in conflict with well-being of members from an out-group, there
can be a conflict with religiosity.
The relation between religiosity and values can also be analyzed in terms of soci-
etal and personal needs which are being fulfilled by religion. Typical sociological
theorizing has stressed the role of religion in supporting the acceptance and the sta-
bility of the existing social order (Durkheim, 1912/1954; Glock, 1973; Marx,
1848/1964; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995). Although in some periods of revolt and
chaos religion can be opposed to the existing social order, the dominant religion will
tend to support and even treat as sacred the existing social order over longer periods
of time (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995; Wilson, 1982). From this sociological point
of view it can be expected that in normal conditions religious institutions will sup-
port respect for and reliance on the existing social order among its members, instead
of creating a critical and independent opinion that can lead to social change.
70 FONTAINE, LUYTEN, CORVELEYN
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Starting from a psychological analysis of personal needs, it has been pointed
out that religion can fulfill the human need for uncertainty avoidance (Durkheim,
1912/1954; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995). By offering a global worldview and a
moral program, the complexity of human life is reduced and clearly structured. Re-
ligion creates a psychologically safe environment. Thus, according to this psycho-
logical point of view, people who have a more intense need for uncertainty
avoidance will be more attracted by religion and the safe environment it creates.
Although these psychological and sociological theories about the relation be-
tween values and religion differ in a number of ways, their predicted associations
of religiosity with individual values are highly compatible. Values that support the
existing social order and stability also lead to a well-defined and certain environ-
ment. Thus, on the basis of the sociological and psychological analyses, religiosity
should be associated with the importance of values that stress the acceptance of
Social Order and lead to Uncertainty Avoidance. Such a value pattern is called an
SU value pattern.
Under the condition that only the sociopsychological analyses holds, the fol-
lowing relations between religiosity and Schwartz’s (1992) value types can be ex-
pected. Religiosity should be correlated most with security and conformity and
should be correlated least with self-direction and stimulation, with decreasing cor-
relations going from security over power, achievement, and hedonism to stimula-
tion and with increasing correlations going from self-direction over universalism,
benevolence, and tradition to conformity (see also Table 2 in the Results section).
Security and conformity values express most clearly the need for a certain and sta-
ble social environment. Self-direction values express most clearly an independent
attitude toward the existing social system, whereas stimulation values, with their
focus on striving for novel experiences, indicate low uncertainty avoidance. Tradi-
tion also implies an acceptance and reliance on the existing social structure. Even
power and, to a lesser extent, achievement fit within the sociological and psycho-
logical perspective. Their main goals, namely social status and personal success,
are reached according to and within the existing social structure. Universalism val-
ues, however, with their focus on well-being for all people, can be critical toward
the existing ingroup social system. Hedonism, although to a lesser extent than
stimulation, can lead to novel experiences and to uncertain environments. Benevo-
lence can be both in accordance with or in opposition to the existing social order,
resulting respectively in certain or uncertain environments.
HUTSEBAUT’S MULTIDIMENSIONAL
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES
Hutsebaut’s (1987, 1990) multidimensional approach to the measurement of reli-
gious attitudes is inspired by Wulff’s (1991, 1997) unifying framework for the vari-
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ous and divergent theoretical and empirical perspectives on the relation between
psychology and religion. According to Wulff, these perspectives can be situated in
a two-dimensional space, spanned by the dimension inclusion versus exclusion of
transcendence and the dimension literal versus symbolical interpretation of reli-
gion (see Figure 2). The two extreme poles of the first dimension indicate whether
the approach allows for the possibility of a transcendent reality. The two extreme
poles of the second dimension refer to whether religion has to be seen as an objec-
tive—right or wrong—representation of reality or as a symbolic system that can
only be understood through a process of interpretation. On the basis of these two di-
mensions, Wulff distinguished four fundamental perspectives toward religion. The
first, Literal Affirmation (inclusion of transcendence and literal thinking), refers to
the position of the orthodox believer or, in its extreme form, the fundamentalist.
The second, Literal Disaffirmation (exclusion of transcendence and literal think-
ing), is the position of the real unbeliever, rejecting religion because it does not of-
72 FONTAINE, LUYTEN, CORVELEYN
FIGURE 2 Integration of Hutsebaut’s (1996) scheme in Wulff’s (1997) theoretical model of religious
attitudes.
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fer a “right” representation of reality. The third, Reductive Interpretation (exclu-
sion of transcendence and symbolic thinking; Wulff mentioned Freud as an
excellent example of holding this position), maintains that religion is an illusion.
Religion is treated as a symbolic system, but the ultimate reality the symbols refer
to is rejected. The meaning of the symbolic system is reduced to nonreligious vari-
ables. Finally, with the Restorative Interpretation (inclusion of transcendence and
symbolic thinking), there is no literal interpretation: Religion is considered a sym-
bolic system, and the reality to which the symbols refer is accepted. It is a position
in which a rational approach toward reality and a trust and a faith in a transcendent
reality is integrated.
Hutsebaut (1996, 1997) used this framework to conceptualize and measure dif-
ferent types of religious attitudes at an individual level. Attitude statements for
each of the four quadrants of Wulff’s (1997) model were generated by experts and
students in psychology of religion. In a first stage of empirical research, three fac-
tors clearly emerged by means of factor analyses, which were named Orthodoxy
(e.g., “Ultimately, there is only one correct answer to each religious question”),
Historical Relativism (e.g., “I consider the Bible to be a guide, full of signposts in
my search for God, and not as an historical account”), and External Critique (e.g.,
“The scientific clarifications of human life and world have made religious clarifi-
cations superfluous”; see Figure 2; Hutsebaut, 1996, 1997). The Orthodoxy scale
measures Wulff’s Literal Affirmation quadrant. For the rejection of transcendence
no empirical distinction was found between Wulff’s Literal Affirmation and
Reductive Interpretation. All items clustered together in a single rejection cluster
that was termed External Critique. The last factor, Historical Relativism, con-
tained items referring to a rational but symbolic belief and thus corresponds to
Wulff’s Restorative Interpretation.
A reanalysis of these data by means of multidimensional scaling (Duriez,
Hutsebaut, & Fontaine, 1999) further revealed that Historical Relativism could be
separated into a cluster of items referring only to the symbolic acceptance of tran-
scendence (e.g., “I consider the Bible to be a guide, full of signposts in my search
for God, and not as an historical account”), which will be further referred to as
Symbolic Belief, and a cluster of items referring to the historical contextualization
of religion (e.g., “I am well aware of the fact that each assertion on God is deter-
mined by the time in which it is formulated”), which will be further referred to as
Relativism.2 Symbolic Belief and Relativism are both characterized by a symbolic
interpretation of religiosity, but Symbolic Belief items clearly implies the inclu-
sion of transcendence, whereas Relativism is characterized by an intermediate po-
sition on the inclusion–exclusion of transcendence dimension (see Figure 2).
The validity of the psychological interpretation of these scales in terms of
Wulff’s (1997) model has been empirically supported by relating them to other re-
DISCRIMINATING VALUE PATTERNS 73
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ligiosity scales, measurements of various attitudes toward God, scales for literal
and symbolic thinking, and measurements of certainty and uncertainty (Hutsebaut,
1996).3
RELATIONS BETWEEN FOUR TYPES OF RELIGIOUS
ATTITUDES AND PERSONAL VALUE ORIENTATION
The theological and sociological or psychological analyses of the relation between
personal value orientation and religious commitment can be straightforwardly ap-
plied to the two dimensions of Wulff’s (1997) theoretical model. The theological
perspective directly relates to the dimension inclusion–exclusion of transcendence.
Individuals who accept transcendence can be expected to be more guided by the
theologically implied values (focused on transcendence and mutual care) than
individuals who reject transcendence. The analysis in terms of societal and psycho-
logical needs closely corresponds to the literal or symbolic dimension. In a literal
mode of thinking, only one right answer is possible. In this way, clarity is created
and uncertainty is removed. To the extent that religion is supportive of the existing
social order, literal belief in religion will not only reduce uncertainty but will also
support the existing social order. In the symbolic mode of thinking, multiple inter-
pretations are possible. This implies a tolerance for uncertainty and for interpreta-
tions that are critical for the existing social order. Thus, a literal mode of thinking
about religion is hypothesized to be more compatible with social stability values
and values that reduce uncertainty than a symbolic mode of thinking.
Because Hutsebaut’s (1996) religiosity scales are derived from Wulff’s
(1997) model, straightforward predictions can be made with regard to the rela-
tion between Hutsebaut’s four religious attitudes scales and their respective
value pattern by combining the theoretically derived TC and SU value patterns.
Participants who score high on Hutsebaut’s Orthodoxy (inclusion of transcen-
dence and literal approach in Wulff’s schema) should be characterized by a
combination of a TC and a SU value pattern. Participants who score high on
Hutsebaut’s External Critique (exclusion of transcendence and literal approach
74 FONTAINE, LUYTEN, CORVELEYN
3Orthodoxy correlated positively with positive God images, anxiety, and guilt feelings in the relation
to God, belief in the Bible, and quest belief, which supports the inclusion of transcendence. Orthodoxy
also correlated positively with literal thinking, religious certainty, and anxiety for new and complex
problems, which supports the literal interpretation. Historical Relativism (combining Symbolic Belief
and Relativism) correlated positively with symbolic thinking and openness for complex questions sup-
porting the symbolic interpretation and correlated positively with positive God images, quest belief, and
belief in the Bible supporting inclusion of transcendence. The last scale, External Critique, correlated
positively with fear for uncertainty which supports the literal interpretation. The exclusion of transcen-
dence is supported by negative correlations with religious certainty, quest belief, belief in the Bible, pos-
itive God images, and by positive correlations with both feelings of frustration toward God and with the
rejection of dependency feelings toward the normative influence of God (Hutsebaut, 1996).
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
, 
Li
br
ar
y]
 A
t:
 1
9:
34
 2
6 
Ma
y 
20
11
in Wulff’s schema) should be characterized by a combination of a reversed TC
value pattern and a SU value pattern. Hutsebaut’s Symbolic Believers (inclusion
of transcendence and symbolic approach in Wulff’s schema) should be charac-
terized by a TC value pattern and a reversed SU value pattern. Because
Hutsebaut’s Relativism items had an intermediate position on Wulff’s dimen-
sion inclusion versus exclusion of transcendence and were clearly situated at the
symbolic side on Wulff’s second dimension, we expect Relativism to be only
characterized by a reversed SU value pattern.
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 211 students ranging from 18 to 29 years old (M = 22); 49% were
men. Half of the respondents were 3rd- and 4th-year psychology students at the
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Belgium) who were each asked to recruit one
other fellow student from the same university to cooperate in this research. All par-
ticipants were Dutch-speaking Belgians. Despite the fact that participants received
no credits, refusal rate was very low (less than 4%).
Measures and Procedure
The data reported here were part of a larger project investigating the intrapersonal
and interpersonal correlates of shame and guilt. Participants were informed that the
study was about “positive and negative emotions in the experience of adults.”
Participants received a booklet containing all questionnaires in a brown enve-
lope, together with the instruction to complete the booklet and to return it in the en-
velope within 2 weeks. Full confidentiality and anonymity were guaranteed.
The following measures were completed by participants: The Dutch translation
of the Schwartz (1992) value survey consisted of 58 values, representing the 10
value types postulated to cover the full range of different human values across cul-
tures (see Table 1). Each value was rated in terms of its importance as a guiding
principle in one’s life on a 9-point scale ranging from –1 (opposed to my princi-
ples) to 0 (not important) to 7 (of supreme importance).4
The unidimensional measure of religious commitment consisted of an aggre-
gate of six items. First, participants were asked whether they considered them-
selves to be a believer without specifying the content of that belief. Then they had
DISCRIMINATING VALUE PATTERNS 75
4As in Schwartz and Huismans (1995), the 10 value scales were computed after correction for the
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to rate five questions, each on 5-point scales, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very
strongly), concerning religious commitment (“How religious do you consider
yourself?” “To what extent does religion influence your daily behavior?” “To
what extent do you believe in the existence of a [personal or nonpersonal] God or a
supernatural reality?” “How much do you feel you are connected with the
Church?” “How often do you attend church services?”). A principal component
analysis supported the unidimensional structure. Only the first component had an
eigenvalue larger than 1, and the scree test (Stevens, 1996) also supported the solu-
tion with one component. Each item had a loading of at least .69 on the single reli-
giosity component. The estimate of internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) of the
Religious Commitment scale5 was .89.
Participants also completed Hutsebaut’s (1996) Post-Critical Belief Scale. This
scale consists of 24 items measuring Hutsebaut’s four religious attitudes. A multidi-
mensional scaling (Kruskal & Wish, 1978) on the Pearson correlations between these
24 items for these participants replicated the existence of four religiosity types situated
in a two-dimensional space as found earlier by Hutsebaut et al. (1998). Estimates of in-
ternal consistencies (Cronbach’s alpha) of the religious attitude scales were .64 for Or-
thodoxy, .84 for Symbolic Belief, .45 for Relativism, and .71 for External Critique.
RESULTS
Bivariate Correlations
The relations between the various measures of religiosity and the 10 value types
were investigated for each religiosity scale separately by means of bivariate corre-
lations (see Table 2). For each religiosity scale, we only report the significant corre-
lations at .05 significance level and whether the pattern of correlations followed a
sinusoid pattern.
First, the bivariate correlations of Religious Commitment with the 10 value
types followed a (near perfect) sinusoid pattern: The most positive correlation was
with tradition, and the most negative correlation was with hedonism (see Table 2).
All other correlations except one (achievement) were situated between these two
in the order predicted by Schwartz’s (1992) value theory. The positive correlations
with tradition, conformity, and benevolence and the negative correlations with he-
donism, stimulation, and self-direction were significant.
Second, each of Hutsebaut’s (1996) four religious attitudes scales were charac-
terized (at least partially) by a different value pattern. Orthodoxy correlated signif-
icantly and positively with tradition, conformity, and security. Orthodoxy
correlated significantly and negatively with self-direction and hedonism (see Ta-
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5This scale was computed as the sum score of the standardized items because not all items were
scored on the same response scale.
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ble 2). Tradition was correlated most positively and self-direction was correlated
most negatively with Orthodoxy. All correlations except one (stimulation) fol-
lowed a sinusoid pattern. The correlations decreased from tradition over benevo-
lence and universalism to self-direction, and they increased from self-direction
over hedonism, achievement, power, security, and conformity to tradition. Stimu-
lation formed an exception: It correlated higher with Orthodoxy than hedonism
correlated with Orthodoxy.
Correlations for Symbolic Belief also followed a near-perfect sinusoid pattern
(see Table 2). Symbolic Belief showed the most positive correlation with tradition.
Correlations decreased over conformity, security, achievement, power, and over
benevolence, universalism, self-direction, and stimulation, to the most negative
with hedonism. Contrary to the sinusoid pattern, achievement correlated higher
(less negative) with Symbolic Belief than power did. The positive correlations
with tradition, benevolence, and conformity and the negative correlations with he-
donism, stimulation, and power were significant.
For Relativism, the pattern was less clear (see Table 2). Relativism correlated
most positively with self-direction and most negatively with hedonism. The corre-
lations of universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security followed
the sinusoid pattern. But the correlations of power, achievement, hedonism, and
stimulation were not in accordance with the sinusoid pattern. Only the positive
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TABLE 2
Theoretical TC and SU Value Patterns and Bivariate Correlations Between the Five Religiosity
Scales and 10 Value Types
Value Pattern Religiosity Scales
Value Type TC SU RC O S R E
HE –.95 –.59 –.25**** –.13* –.35***** –.16** .18**
ST –.59 –.95 –.18*** .01 –.15** –.06 –.04
SD .00 –.95 –.17** –.15** –.09 .14** .06
UN .59 –.59 –.07 –.10 .08 .11 –.08
BE .95 .00 .14** .01 .19*** .09 –.06
TR .95 .59 .36***** .27***** .37***** –.03 –.32*****
CO .59 .95 .24**** .22*** .17** –.09 –.01
SE .00 .95 .12* .15** –.06 –.12* .04
PO –.59 .59 –.07 .04 –.18** –.05 .10
AC –.95 .00 –.01 –.00 –.11 –.02 .08
Note. TC = Transcendent–Mutual Care; SU = Social Order–Uncertainty Avoidance; HE = Hedonism; ST =
Stimulation; SD = Self–Direction; UN = Universalism; BE = Benevolence; TR = Tradition; CO = Conformity; SE
= Security; PO = Power; AC = Achievement; RC = Religious Commitment; O = Orthodoxy; S = Symbolic Belief;
R = Relativism; E = External Critique.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. ****p < .001. *****p < .0001.
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correlation with self-direction and the negative correlations with hedonism and se-
curity reached statistical significance.
The most eye-catching findings for External Critique were the significant posi-
tive correlation with hedonism and the significant negative correlation with tradi-
tion (see Table 2). The other correlations were not significant and did not show an
apparent consistent pattern.
Finally, differences in bivariate correlations with each value scale for each pair
of religiosity scales were tested at .05 significance level by means of a t test for dif-
ferences in correlations for dependent samples (Blalock, 1972; Hinkle, Wiersma,
& Jurs, 1988; Klugh, 1986). Each pair of religiosity scales correlated significantly
differently with at least one value type (see Table 3).
Regression Analyses for the Explanation of the Value
Patterns
To investigate the extent to which the observed value patterns could be attributed to
the two theoretically derived value patterns, regression analyses have been per-
formed with the observed value patterns as dependent variables and the two hypo-
thetical TC and SU value patterns as independent variables (see Table 2). Given the
assumption that all value types are situated on a perfect circle and that all adjacent
value types are equidistant from one another, the expected value pattern could be
obtained by computing the sine of the angle of the value type on the circle (see Ta-
ble 2).6
The value pattern associated with Religious Commitment was somewhat more
related to the SU value pattern than to the TC value pattern. Together, both theoret-
ical value patterns account for 87% of the observed value pattern of Religious
Commitment (see Table 4).
Up to 73% of the value pattern associated with the Orthodoxy scale could be ac-
counted for by the two theoretical value patterns. But only the SU value pattern
showed a significant positive weight (see Table 4).
For Symbolic Belief, only the weight of the TC value pattern was significant
(see Table 4). Up to 86% of the Symbolic Belief scale could be accounted for by
the TC and SU patterns.
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6However, the latter assumption cannot be fully justified by Schwartz’s (1992) value theory. Empiri-
cal research with the Schwartz value scale supports only the rank order of the value types and not equi-
distant positions from a common origin and adjacent value types (e.g., see Schwartz, 1992). Therefore,
besides a classical regression analyses with the perfect sinusoid value pattern, an optimal scaling regres-
sion analysis was also performed. In optimal scaling regression analysis, only the ordinal information in
the independent variables is taken into account. The results of optimal scaling regression analyses were
highly comparable with the results reported in this article.
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The value patterns of the Relativism and External Critique scales could not
be predicted as well by the two theoretical value patterns as Orthodoxy, Sym-
bolic Belief, and Religious Commitment (see Table 4). Only 57% of the Relativ-
ism value pattern and 58% of the External Critique value pattern could be
accounted for. The TC value pattern had a significant positive weight, and the
SU value pattern had a significant negative weight for the prediction of the Rela-
tivism value pattern. For External Critique there was only a significant negative
weight of the TC value pattern.
DISCUSSION
First, the five religiosity scales in this study (Religious Commitment, Orthodoxy,
Symbolic Belief, Relativism, and External Critique) were each clearly associated
with a different value pattern. At least one and up to three value types had a signifi-
cant different association for any pair of the religiosity scales. Regression analyses
also showed that each religiosity scale was characterized by a different and in gen-
eral predicted and theoretically meaningful pattern of weights of the two theoretical
value patterns. Thus, these results further support the validity of Hutsebaut’s (1996,
1997; Duriez et al., 1999) conceptualization of religious attitudes.
Second, the value pattern associated with Religious Commitment can be best un-
derstood in terms of a combination of the theological and the sociopsychological
value patterns. The theological TC value pattern and the sociopsychological SU
valuepatterncontributedaboutequally,withaslightoverweightof theSUvaluepat-
tern. Moreover, the observed value pattern associated with Religious Commitment
replicated the findings of Schwartz and Huismans (1995).
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TABLE 4
Multiple Regression Analyses of the Sinusoid TC and SU Value Patterns on the Five
Religiosity Value Patterns
Theoretical Value Patterns
Religiosity Scales bTC bSU R2
Religious
Commitment
.54** .61** .87***
Orthodoxy .21 .77** .73**
Symbolic Belief .87*** .15 .86***
Relativism .65* –.63* .57
External Critique –.77* .04 .58*
Note. TC = Transcendent–Mutual Care; SU = Social Order–Uncertainty Avoidance; bTC =
standardized weights for TC value pattern; bSU = standardized weights for SU value pattern.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Third, results concerning Hutsebaut’s (1996) scales clearly show that the rela-
tion between religiosity and value orientation differs for the various types of reli-
gious attitudes. In line with our hypotheses, the SU value pattern has the highest
positive weight for Orthodoxy. This supports the hypothesis that an orthodox ap-
proach to religion is characterized by a striving for save social environments and
uncertainty avoidance. However, no support for the presence of the TC value pat-
tern was found. This pattern was expected to be significantly associated with the
Orthodoxy value pattern because Orthodoxy implies a positive attitude toward
transcendence. However, when we take a closer look at the bivariate correlations
(see Table 2), Orthodoxy is most positively correlated with tradition and is nearly
as negatively correlated with hedonism as with self-direction, as could be expected
on the basis of the theological TC value pattern. However, contrary to the TC value
pattern, Orthodoxy is not positively related to benevolence and universalism and is
not negatively related to achievement and power. Thus, although the orthodox
value pattern shows little resemblance with the TC value pattern as a whole, it does
share its focus on tradition and on hedonism.
Symbolic Belief is, as expected, characterized by the theological TC value pat-
tern. This could mean that symbolic believers really want to live according to their
beliefs. However, the observed value pattern associated with Symbolic Belief did
not show a resemblance with the inverted sociopsychological SU value pattern. A
resemblance was expected on the basis of the low uncertainty avoidance associ-
ated with a symbolic mode of thinking. Instead, a slightly positive but
nonsignificant weight for the SU value pattern was observed. Nevertheless, the
sociopsychological SU value pattern was far more important for Orthodoxy than
for Symbolic Belief, as predicted. Furthermore, if we turn to the bivariate correla-
tions between Symbolic Belief and the 10 value types, we observe some deviations
from the predicted theological TC value pattern. Based on the theological analysis
about the importance of transcendence and mutual care, the highest correlations
were predicted for tradition and benevolence on one hand and the lowest for hedo-
nism and achievement on the other. However, Symbolic Belief correlated less pos-
itively with benevolence than with tradition and less negatively with achievement
than with hedonism. This suggests that the mutual care perspective is probably less
important than the focus on transcendence for symbolic believers.
As expected, the value pattern associated with Relativism is characterized by
low uncertainty avoidance and a critical attitude toward the existing social order as
is shown by the positive correlation with self-direction and the negative correla-
tion with security. However, it was not expected that the Relativism value pattern
was also characterized to some extent by the theological TC value pattern (most
evident in the significant negative correlation with hedonism). A possible explana-
tion of this finding could be that most participants in our study, including relativis-
tic participants, have received a religious upbringing that still influences their
value pattern (see also, Hutsebaut, 1997). However, because Relativism consists
DISCRIMINATING VALUE PATTERNS 81
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of only three items and its internal consistency is rather low, further empirical re-
search is needed on this scale. The low internal consistency also probably accounts
for the overall low correlations found with this scale and for the fact that the two
theoretical value patterns accounted less well for the observed value pattern than
was the case for Religious Commitment, Orthodoxy, and Symbolic Belief.
External Critique was only negatively correlated with tradition and positively
correlated with hedonism, which only partially matches the predicted inverted theo-
logical TC value pattern. Other correlations were not significant and did not show a
consistent pattern. A possible explanation for these results can be found in
Hutsebaut’s (1996)earlier findings.Hefound thatExternalCritiquecorrelatedposi-
tively with both feelings of frustration toward God—indicating an initial dependent
attitude—and feelings of autonomy—contradicting acceptance and dependence on
a higher being. This points to two motivational pathways to External Critique. Reli-
gion could be rejected because of a frustration of an initial dependent attitude or be-
cause it is considered to be irreconcilable with one’s striving for autonomy. This
probably means that people who score high on External Critique form a heteroge-
neous group that only share the rejection of transcendence and thus the typical value
orientation implied by the rejection of the transcendent perspective.
Thus, our theoretically derived SU and TC value patterns shed a new light on
the relation between various forms of religiosity measures and value orientation.
Nevertheless, when we consider the results of Religious Commitment, Orthodoxy,
Symbolic Belief, and External Critique, one general trend comes to the fore: Reli-
giosity is always associated with stressing the importance of tradition values and
the de-emphasizing of hedonism values, irrespective of whether religion is inter-
preted in a literal or symbolic way.
CONCLUSIONS
This study replicates the systematic pattern of associations reported by Schwartz
and Huismans (1995) between Religious Commitment and 10 value types. The re-
finement of Schwartz and Huismans’s theoretical rationale for deriving hypotheses
about the relation between religiosity and value patterns, which led to the isolation
of two different theoretically expected value patterns instead of only one, was also
empirically supported. The value patterns associated with Religious Commitment
and four types of religious attitudes could be explained as a weighted combination
of two theoretically derived value patterns, namely a theological TC value pattern
and a sociopsychological SU value pattern.
Furthermore, differences between the observed value patterns could be interpreted
in terms of different weights of the two theoretical value patterns. Religiosity scales
that imply an acceptance of transcendence (e.g., Symbolic Belief) are very well ex-
plained by the two theoretically derived value patterns, supporting the comprehensive-
ness of the present theoretical framework. However, religiosity scales that are neutral
82 FONTAINE, LUYTEN, CORVELEYN
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toward or even reject transcendence (e.g., External Critique) are less well explained by
these two value patterns. This could point to the fact that rejection of transcendence is
not just the reverse of acceptance of it from a psychological point of view (see also,
Vergote, 1996). Thus, these results suggest that not only the acceptance but also the re-
jection of transcendence should be scrutinized in future research for a better under-
standing of the relation between religiosity and personal value orientation.
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